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Congressional Research Service

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540

April 12, 1976

To: House Subcommittee on International
Organizations
Attention: Mr. Boettcher

From: American Law Division

Subject: Statutes Affecting Domestic Activities of Certain Foreign
Controlled Organizations

Reference is made to your inquiry of April 1, 1976, request-
ing information on an upcoming hearing involving certain organizations
which may be in league with or otherwise promoting the interests of a
foreign Government.

We have examined the confidential material submitted by



STAT Generally, the statutory authorities cited in our
memorandum of March 12, 1976, seem to be the ones having a bearing on
the problem described therein, viz: the Foreign Agents Registration
Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §§611-621, which imposes severe criminal sanctions on
any person who acts as an agent of a foreign principal within the United
States unless he files a certified registration statement with the Attorney
General; 18 U.S.C. §951, which makes it a federal crime for any person,
other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attache, to act in the
United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notifi-
cation to the Secretary of State; 18 U.S.C.A. §219, which makes it a
criminal offense punishable by not more than \$10,000 and or two years,
for any person who, being an officer or employee of the United States in


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the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government or in any agency of the United States, including the District of Columbia, is or acts as an agent of a foreign principal required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act; 18 U.S.C.A. §613 (Supp.), which makes it a crime for a foreign national to make contributions to any election for public offices.

As explained during earlier conferences on this and related matters, there are other provisions which conceivably could come into play, but which on the basis of known and alleged facts are unlikely at best, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. §310, prohibits the grant of an FCC license to aliens or representatives of aliens, foreign governments and their agents, foreign corporations, and any corporations controlled by other corporations owned or substantially controlled by aliens; 50 U.S.C.A. §851, which requires every person who has knowledge of, or has received instruction or assignment in, the espionage, counter espionage, or sabotage service or tactics of a government of a foreign political party to register with the Attorney General; 47 U.S.C.A. §303, 310, which regulates the grant of licenses to noncitizens for radio stations on aircraft. Even more remote — both in terms of apparent relevancy and desuetude — is the Voorhis Anti-Propaganda Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §2386, that, inter alia, requires every organization subject to a foreign control which engages in political activity to register with the Attorney General. See 28 C.F.R. §§10.0 to 10.9.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act appears to be the paramount relevant legal requirement in the present circumstances. It should be

noted, however, that the Act expressly excludes "(e) any person engaging or agreeing to engage only in activities in furtherance of bona fide religious, scholastic, academic, or scientific pursuits or of the fine arts." 22 U.S.C.A. §613. In this regard, although the law does not necessitate a contract to establish an agency, because of the severe penal sanctions it imposes, something more than not speaking ill of foreign leader X or not working at cross purposes with him seems needed. However, if the agency exists, then the law requires the agent to file political propaganda for or the interest of his foreign principal whether in the form of prints or what have you. 22 U.S.C.A. §614. The term print includes "newspapers and periodicals." 22 U.S.C.A. §611.


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HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

South Korea

TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 1973

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

See p. 179

The subcommittee met at 2:17 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today the Subcommittee on International Organizations will be reviewing the human rights situation in South Korea and assessing how the U.S. Government should respond to that situation. Today's hearing is part of a series of human rights hearings on the Philippines and South Korea. An additional hearing on Korea will be held on June 12. An additional hearing on the Philippines will be held on June 17. The State Department will be testifying on both country situations on June 24.

Prof. Jai Hyon Lee served as a career civil servant of the Republic of Korea for nearly 20 years. Until his defection in June 1973, he served for 3 years in Washington as chief cultural and information attaché and as director of the Korean Information Office.

Dr. William Thompson is the stated clerk of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. He recently visited South Korea as part of a three-member team for the World Council of Churches.

Prof. Richard Walker is director of the Institute of International Studies of the University of South Carolina. He has been especially concerned with international security questions relating to South Korea.

I want to welcome all of you gentlemen. Professor Lee, perhaps we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF JAI HYON LEE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF JOURNALISM, WESTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, to begin with, I wish to express my deep appreciation for your wisdom to hold this series of hearings on the repression of human rights in South Korea and its implications for U.S. policy.

Indeed, the current situation in South Korea deserves much more attention of the Government and people of the United States for many reasons:

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First, the Korean peninsula is a potential tinderbox which, should it be ignited, threatens to embroil the United States in another international conflict. Unlike Indochina, the Korean peninsula is squeezed between Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. In this strategic peninsula, the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China maintain a delicate balance of power.

Second, the credibility of the United States is at stake due to the continuing support of the United States for Park Chung Hee's dictatorial rule and for his policies, reaffirming the American guarantee and American aid for South Korea's defense regardless of democratic prospects in that country. The world has been told for nearly 50 years by the highest authorities of the United States that the purpose of American aid to South Korea was to defend democracy there.

In South Korea today, Park is rooting out the slightest sign of the democracy for which Americans have paid with 30,000 lives and billions of dollars and for which Koreans have paid with 2 million lives and near total destruction of the country.

It is a tragic irony that the United States has put itself almost completely in dictator Park's corner. Visiting South Korea last November, for example, President Ford did not indicate by word or gesture any thing but full support of Park's dictatorial leadership and for his repressive national policies as well. Even if defense and security alone were the U.S. aim in South Korea, Park's repression of human rights radically undermines that objective.

For that matter, we recently had a painful experience in Vietnam. Massive American military and economic aid to the corrupt, repressive regime of South Vietnam could not make its countrymen fight for what they did not support.

Free, participatory government and military strength are part and parcel of any country's sound defense posture against Communist threat. Regrettably, in the past decade, U.S. military pragmatism has grossly overlooked the importance of the former and solely concentrated on the latter, thus making a grave mistake of supporting any dictator for the convenience of his anti-Communist stand.

Consequently, Park's unpopular dictatorship is seriously endangering South Korean defense which is still supported by 42,000 U.S. troops, a stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons and massive U.S. military aid.

To avoid redundancy and save time, Mr. Chairman, I will not recount Park's barbaric repression of human rights, freedom of the press, freedom of religion and his irregularities of legal procedures as well as torture stories which the Rev. George Ogle, the Rev. James Sinnott, Mr. Brian Wrobel and other witnesses have already testified about before this committee in the previous hearings. Instead, I will testify on other aspects that have not yet been touched upon.

Until June 6, 1973, I had been for 3 years Chief Cultural and Information Attaché with the Korean Embassy in Washington and concurrently Director of the Korean Information Office in the United States.

It was during this period, in October 1972, that Park decreed sweeping changes in South Korea. Ostensibly, it was to help further "the North-South dialog" and to accommodate to the U.S. policy of détente in East Asia. The changes were in fact a declaration of martial law

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that abolished, through Park's newly imposed constitution, South Korea's fragile and imperfect democracy.

In March 1973, I was called to meetings in Seoul where I was given a series of unconvincing explanations for such changes. In short, I was instructed to tell the U.S. Government and press that if there is internal opposition to his policies, he cannot negotiate from a position of equal strength with Kim Il Sung, head of North Korea. At these meetings which lasted 10 days, however, my colleagues of the home office secretly pointed out to me those agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) who were there for surveillance.

I had been a career civil servant of the Republic of Korea nearly 20 years and held the highest personal rank a professional civil service officer could reach but never before had I attended a meeting under surveillance of the secret police. By then I had been aware of the KCIA's increasing brutality against its own citizens. In public none of my old friends wanted to talk about what was going on in South Korea but in private many whispered to me:

That Park's martial law constitution was essentially designed to eliminate criticism and opposition, to strip the South Korean people of human and civil rights and to establish a complete and permanent dictatorship;

That it was neither to help further "the North-South dialog" as he declared nor to develop a freer and more democratic society;

That Park's pretext was a sheer window dressing for American consumption since he and every other Korean knew he could not perpetuate in power without U.S. support, particularly military aid.

At that time the United States had its hands full in Vietnam, in the Middle East and in the Watergate and Park's worries about American disapproval of dictatorship ebbed with Washington's declining interest in other areas.

Shortly after I returned to Washington the Star-News published columnist Crosby Noyes' article quoting unsuccessful 1971 presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung's criticism of Park's martial law constitution. The Seoul government censured me for not stopping it and threatened me to face "the consequences." Furthermore, Seoul instructed me to "play up" in the United States "the grave threat of imminent North Korean attack."

But I knew this was not true. South Koreans have always lived under the Communist threat from the North ever since the armistice of 1953, and there was no more evidence of an increased threat of an open attack than at any other time. Indeed, the Communist threat from the North has become an all-purpose bogeyman for the Park regime that can be used whenever necessary in Korea, in the United States or elsewhere.

Meanwhile, the South Korean Ambassador had been calling frequent staff meetings since my return to Washington. At all these meetings the KCIA station chief briefed the Embassy's overall scheme of clandestine operations to mute criticism of Park's totalitarianism and to buy off its supporters in the United States.

From these meetings I learned that Park's plan for clandestine operations in the United States was a highly sophisticated one which was based on the three basic techniques of seduction, payoff, and

intimidation. Once a subject is seduced and paid off, he becomes subject to intimidation.

Included in the plan were:

(1) To seduce and, if possible, buy off American leaders—particularly in Congress—who have had any kind of close personal contacts with Korea through the Korean war or business. Because of its nature, this phase of operation was almost entirely left to the Ambassador.

(2) To apply covert pressure on the important American businessmen who have vested interest in Korea to exercise their influence in the Congress and the administration to support Park's repressive policies.

(3) To organize more American and Korean business groups, like the American-Korean Chamber of Commerce in New York and elsewhere, that would voice support for Park through their officers possibly handpicked and probed by the KCIA.

(4) To organize professional associations and societies of Korean scholars and scientists in the United States and American scholars in the areas of Korea, East Asia, and Communist affairs studies to extract their support for Park, with reward of Embassy entertainments and possibly free VIP trips to Korea.

(5) To organize indirectly, or to finance covertly scholastic meetings, seminars and symposia of Korean and American professors to rationalize Park's dictatorship or, at least, to curb their criticism. For example, such was a seminar held at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Mich., shortly after Park's October 1972 martial law. The Embassy's education attaché who was entrusted and paid off for this operation later boasted that, as a result, the organizer of the meeting wrote a letter to the New York Times in support of Park's police state measures.

Another example is the April 1973 symposium at the Washington Hilton Hotel on "Korea and the Powers in the 1970's" jointly sponsored by the Institute for Asian Studies of Washington, D.C., and Kyung Nam University of Masan, Korea. Paying the participants all the travel expenses and allowances, the Seoul government financed this operation through a pro-Park Korean newspaper publisher in Washington, D.C.

(6) To publish through KCIA's front-men pro-Park Korean community newspapers in Washington and some other major cities in the United States to disseminate Park's propaganda among the Korean residents. Now they even publish an English language propaganda paper, "Washington Observer." No doubt you receive it and no doubt you are not subscribers to this paper: in other words, this is free distribution.

(7) To operate and finance through KCIA's front-men and collaborators Park's propaganda Korean language broadcasting in Washington and other areas of large Korean communities. In fact, such broadcasting has been in gross violation of the Federal Communications Commission's "fairness doctrine."

(8) To recruit Korean communities in the United States by infiltrating with front-men or undercover agents the established Korean residents' associations and by creating new ones where such associations have not yet been organized. The purpose was to indirectly

control and manipulate the Korean communities through the planted officers of such organizations to silence criticism of Park's repressive rule by singling out and intimidating dissident members and to stage in the name of associations falsified campaigns of Korean residents' total support for Park before the eyes of the U.S. Government and people.

In my observation, this wild operation of fear arousing type has succeeded particularly in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles in maintaining Korean consulate-manipulated residents associations which are in fact front organizations of the Park regime. For instance, there will be an "anti-communist" pro-Park rally of Korean residents this coming Sunday, June 15, at Lisner Auditorium in Washington, D.C.—right before the eyes of the U.S. Congress and the White House—to impress the Americans and to mute dissident Korean communities in the United States.

According to absolutely credible inner sources whose names I must withhold for obvious reason, this really is actually being staged by the KCIA operating out of the Korean Embassy in Washington. Here I have with me the announcement of this rally, published in a Park regime-financed Washington Korean newspaper, Hankook Shinmoon, which conveniently provides a list of many KCIA front-men, undercover agents, collaborators and its front organizations which I have described in the above.¹

Listed here as sponsoring organizations are: Korean Associations of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, Baltimore, and San Francisco; "Mijoo Hankook"; "Hankook Shinmoon"; Washington Korean Language Broadcasting; Washington Korean Broadcasting and Washington Korean Television.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this material for the record.

Mr. FRASER. Without objection, we will make it a part of the record.

Mr. LEE. Thank you, sir.²

I don't believe any of those organizations has registered with the Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Incidentally, all funds for clandestine operations of the KCIA and Embassy are either hand carried by individuals or received from Seoul in cash by diplomatic pouch and all payoffs are always in cold cash. The Internal Revenue Service should also look into these dubious businesses.

(9) To intimidate "uncooperative" Korean residents in the United States through their families, relatives and close friends in Korea, to silence dissidents and to make already silent ones more "cooperative."

This has been quite effective. Since every Korean knows the KCIA's efficient brutality, many Korean residents in the United States live with the fearful specks of the KCIA. Threatened directly or indirectly by KCIA operatives, most of them are reluctant to report to proper American authorities for fear of reprisal even in this country.

Some of them are not even so covert. In the Washington area, for instance, Yung Chin Kim of George Washington University's Sino-Soviet Institute, Kang Young Heon of the Research Institute on Korean Affairs, Hahn Kwang Neun of "Hankook Shinmoon," Lee Kwang Jae of Washington Korean Broadcasting and Harry Oh of

¹ The newspaper referred to is retained in the subcommittee's files.

² The document is retained in the subcommittee's files.

Washington Korean Television are widely known among the Korean residents here as having close connections with the Korean Embassy's KCIA agents and recently making frequent trips to Seoul.³ Mere presence of those arouses enough fear to mute many Koreans.

On the west coast, KCIA operatives are even extorting money from Korean residents. These Korean residents are so afraid of KCIA reprisal that they do not dare report to police. This is incredible.

Now while the Ambassador and KCIA station chief were hammering out the plan I have just described and assigning various phases of these illegal clandestine operations in the United States to the Embassy staff, a KCIA representative called from Seoul to speak to the master of ceremonies, Dr. Woonho Dong, at an assembly of Korean Christian scholars in St. Louis, Mo., on April 14, 1973, and warned him against an anti-Park statement.

In New York, on April 22, 1973, Korean consul and KCIA agent, In Duk Son, followed demonstrators protesting against Park's dictatorship and had them photographed.

In San Francisco, on May 11, 1973, Korean consul and KCIA agent from Los Angeles, Young Shik Bai, appeared at a rally for the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, accompanied by several toughs carrying eggs and bottles of tomato ketchup. When apprehended, one of the toughs, Min Hi Lee, now president of San Francisco Korean Association, began abusing Mr. Kim and tussled with Kim supporters until removed by a police detachment. Korean consul and KCIA agent Bai intervened with police unsuccessfully.

There are other cases of harassment by KCIA which are reported in an article by David Binder, "Threat to Koreans in U.S. by Seoul Stirs Concern," the New York Times, August 17, 1973. Another case was reported in the August 24, 1974, San Francisco Examiner article by Ken Wong, "Foe of President Park: Death Threat to Korean Here."

Mr. Chairman, I submit copies of both articles for inclusion in the record.

Mr. FRASER. They will be included in the record.⁴

Mr. LEE. These are only a few published cases but there are many other cases more covertly and cautiously handled. Recently the Park regime has more than doubled KCIA operatives in the Korean Embassy and still carries out such illegal operations in the United States as I have so far described.

One day in late April 1973 I was astonished to learn that my senior assistant, Mr. Hyohk Heon Han, a long-time career civil service officer, was abruptly recalled to Seoul without post and was replaced by a new noncareer appointee of the regime without good reason. Knowing clearly by then Park's totalitarian intentions, Mr. Han quietly resigned and chose to remain in the United States, whereupon the Seoul government sternly instructed me to bring him back to Korea at any cost. I refused! Fierce telephone exchanges between the Seoul government and myself followed about a week—Seoul insisting his forced return and I firmly refusing the threatening order.

In one telephone call from Seoul, Park's Minister of Culture and

³ See appendix No. 6, p. 450.

⁴ The first article appears in appendix No. 5, p. 447. The second article is retained in the subcommittee's files.

Information specifically told me in argot to frame up Mr. Han in such a way—implying, for example, “communist agent”—to make the U.S. Government extradite him.

I was shocked! I could not believe my own ear. That fanatic regime was now ordering me to commit a crime against innocent persons. There was no more doubt in my mind that South Korea had become a complete police state.

All these meetings in Seoul and at the Embassy in Washington during the past 10 weeks clearly indicated a terrible conspiracy against my own people, against American friends, and against humanity. That corrupt, dictatorial regime was instructing me to disseminate false information and erect a facade of democracy in the United States to retain American support and military aid.

I was infuriated, disillusioned, and deeply saddened. I was determined to resign.

On Monday, June 4, 1973, just about 2 years ago, when I went to the Embassy, the KCIA station chief called me to his office. It was an interrogation. That ended for the time being shortly before lunch hours.

My suspicions now hardened that my family had been watched in the past 4 or 5 days for strangely enough, at our apartment, we had constantly had unexpected visitors—Korean news correspondent, Embassy staff, and their families—every day from morning till well after midnight.

I was very afraid. I felt real danger. Everybody knew the KCIA station chief was the organizer of the 1967 mass kidnapping of U.S. Korean students in West Germany. And now Seoul wanted two former Government employees forcibly brought back to Korea for reprisal.

I was convinced that now my simple resignation would not suffice to stop it. I had to move fast. I had to seek an immediate protection of my family, myself, my former assistants and their families. And I had to whistle the United States, the most trusted ally of the Korean people, what sort of danger Park's dictatorship was headed for in the Korean peninsula and its implications for Koreans and Americans.

It took me 2 years to come here today to tell these things. I have been working for the last 2 years to explain the situation to the Government and the people of the United States, and I am very grateful that I can do it here.

I did not return to the Embassy that afternoon. Next morning, I denounced Park's dictatorship in a public statement and sought political asylum in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, here is a copy of the June 7, 1973, Washington Post article by John Saar, “South Korea Aide Defects Here: South Korea Diplomat Here Defects to United States, Fears Reprisal,” which gives further details. I would like to submit this material for the record.

Mr. FRASER. The material will be so included in the record.^a

Mr. LEE. At about 2 a.m. the day after my defection, two Korean men came around the house of my friend, Julie Moon, a Korean journalist, whose entire family was terrified. Recently, about a month ago, a similar incident took place. A Korean man attempted to open the front door of her house. When a guest of the house called out and rushed to the door, the man ran down the hillside road.

^a See appendix No. 5, p. 118.

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cal pressure to stifle all voices of opposition, except a few token ones he keeps to impress the United States. But his incredible repression is not just limited within South Korea. What is more incredible is that Park's KCIA arm is far stretched into the United States, illegally manipulating American institutions and intimidating Korean residents in this country. Yet Park wants American aid and support.

Aiding Park's repressive regime is to become an active partner in a savage repression of the very institutions and beliefs the United States espoused and intended to encourage, and the United States will be in an armed league with dictator Park against democracy in Korea and against the goals and interests of the United States.

Democracy has never been forced upon Korea; it is the will of the Korean people clearly expressed in the 1919 Declaration of Korean Independence.

At the end of World War II, the U.S. intervention brought back Korea's independence from the Japanese occupation. After so many centuries of undying struggle for freedom, human rights, prosperity, and peace, Koreans in 1945 identified their goals with the defense interest of their liberator, the United States. In 1950, therefore, Koreans in the South as well as in the North enthusiastically welcomed the U.S. intervention to drive out North Korean Communist aggressors.

Today most Koreans still remember the United States is on official record:

That United States aid, both military and economic, to the Republic of Korea has been predicated upon the existence and growth of democratic institutions within the Republic.

The cruelties of North Korean Communist invaders during the Korean war, combined with the democratic spirit of Korean independence, eliminated long ago any serious Communist threat of subversion in South Korea. Now it is changing with Park's despotism which will eventually invite Communist threat—either subversion or otherwise. We know that from the shattering experience in Vietnam where the authoritarianism of a strong-arm ruler helped lead to a Communist triumph. This should be a stark lesson for the United States.

Since the fall of Indochina, it looks as if Park has things going for him, exploiting the alleged Communist threat to crack down even harder. Nevertheless, Koreans are used to some democracy after 25 years. Therefore, more imminent danger is that Park's continued repression of human rights will plunge the nation into chaos. The possibility of a head on clash between the Park regime and the public demanding a return to democracy can never be ruled out in Korea.

In desperation, Park might be tempted to divert the public's attention to "North Korean threat" by creating an incident to involve the nation in military strife—or by exploiting one that North Korea might conveniently provide. Then the United States would also be caught in the middle of another Korean war. If this century taught us anything, it is never to ignore fanatics.

As an immediate measure, therefore, I recommend the U.S. Government to use the only kind of language a man like Park understands; that is, to suspend the U.S. military aid to the Park regime until democratic institutions are restored in South Korea.

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 cal institutions, sound economy, and healthy social structures, South Koreans will defend themselves for these values and lifestyle against any external attack without U.S. troops. Consequently, the United States will be able to withdraw its troops in due course.

In concluding, I contend that the United States should take an immediate measure to withhold military aid to the Park regime and concurrently a diplomatic effort aimed at a guarantee of the stability in Korea by the countries having an interest, thus reducing the chance of Communist miscalculations.

At this point I would like to depart from my text and add one more information which I have just received. Some American friends are receiving pamphlets, a 17-page booklet titled "Case Against Kim Chi Ha," supposedly published by the so-called Institute of Current Affairs, IPO Box 4389, Seoul, Korea, but this was mailed by the Korean Consulate General in New York, which tries to convince the American people that a brave, democratic citizen like Kim Chi Ha is a Communist.

Now-a-days in South Korea anyone who speaks against the dictatorship is called Communist, and by this move a vast operation of propaganda to undermine a freedom fighter in South Korea clearly indicates Park's intention to kill this poet, Kim Chi Ha, a Catholic, as Park has already killed eight innocent people framed up as Communists under the name of a nonexisting KCIA-fabricated organization called Inhyok-dang, the People's Revolutionary Party.

With this addition, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for having invited me to this hearing and having listened to my testimony.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Professor Lee.*

We will turn now for the second witness to Professor Walker.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD LOUIS WALKER, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Mr. WALKER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, it is a privilege for me to be able to share with you today some observations about the current situation in East Asia and in particular on the Korean Peninsula.

I believe I should point out that my interest in this area dates back more than 30 years when I served there during World War II and that East Asia has been the focus of my specialization and concentration ever since. Just a quarter of a century ago this month I was recalled to active service when North Korea launched an attack against the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, so I believe you can understand I have an especial interest in the problem of security in Korea and in developments on that peninsula.

I have followed with intense interest your subcommittee's hearings over the past 2 years and had the opportunity to submit a statement for your record last year while I was in Hawaii conducting research on the problem of our security relations in the Western Pacific.

* Following the hearing, Congressman Fraser asked the Department of Justice to investigate the allegations made by Dr. Jai Hyeon Lee. See appendix No. 7, p. 453.